Legislative differences in the definition of ‘animals’ risk undermining UK animal welfare

UK law defines “animals” in multiple, conflicting ways, and these inconsistencies are now significant enough to raise questions about whether the government’s legislative framework can reliably protect the species it recognises as sentient. The Animal Sentience Committee’s recent analysis highlights that the statutory landscape has not kept pace with scientific understanding, leaving gaps in protection that are difficult to justify.

The Animal Welfare (Sentience) Act 2022 recognises all vertebrates, as well as cephalopod molluscs and decapod crustaceans, as sentient beings capable of experiencing pain and suffering. However, many older and still‑operative laws use narrower definitions. The Animal Welfare Act 2006, for example, applies only to vertebrates unless extended by regulation and excludes free‑living wild animals from the category of “protected animals.” Other legislation governing slaughter, transport, scientific procedures, and veterinary interventions also relies on definitions that do not align with the 2022 Act.

This divergence means that an animal recognised as sentient in one statute may lack basic welfare protections in another. The Committee notes that this creates uncertainty for regulators and enforcement bodies, who must operate within the limits of the legislation rather than the broader scientific evidence. The result is a system in which the scope of protection depends less on an animal’s capacity to suffer and more on the historical quirks of the statute under which it falls.

The government’s position is increasingly difficult to reconcile with its stated commitment to evidence‑based animal welfare. If Parliament accepts that cephalopods and decapods are sentient, it follows that their exclusion from older welfare laws leaves them vulnerable to avoidable harm. The Committee’s report makes clear that this inconsistency is not merely theoretical: it affects how animals may be handled, transported, used in research, or killed.

The broader implication is that the UK’s animal welfare framework lacks coherence. Without harmonised definitions, the Committee’s role in scrutinising policy for its impact on animal welfare is constrained, and the public cannot be confident that protections are applied consistently. The government must now address whether it intends to align the statute book with contemporary scientific understanding or continue to rely on a fragmented system that offers uneven protection to sentient animals.